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The writings of John Stuart Mill have become the cornerstone of political liberalism. Collected for the first time in this volume are Mill’s three seminal and most widely read works: On Liberty, The Subjection of Women, and Utilitarianism. A brilliant defense of individual rights versus the power of the state, On Liberty is essential reading for anyone interested in political thought and theory. As Bertrand Russell reflected, “On Liberty remains a classic . . . the present world would be better than it is, if [Mill’s] principles were more respected.”
This Modern Library Paperback Classics edition includes newly commissioned endnotes and commentary by Dale E. Miller, and an index.
- Sales Rank: #117822 in Books
- Brand: Mill, John Stuart/ Schneewind, J. B. (INT)
- Published on: 2002-05-14
- Released on: 2002-05-14
- Original language: English
- Number of items: 1
- Dimensions: 8.00" h x .90" w x 5.20" l, .66 pounds
- Binding: Paperback
- 400 pages
From the Inside Flap
The writings of John Stuart Mill have become the cornerstone of political liberalism. Collected for the first time in this volume are Mill's three seminal and most widely read works: "On Liberty, The Subjection of Women, and Utilitarianism. A brilliant defense of individual rights versus the power of the state, "On Liberty is essential reading for anyone interested in political thought and theory. As Bertrand Russell reflected, "On Liberty remains a classic . . . the present world would be better than it is, if [Mill's] principles were more respected."
This Modern Library Paperback Classics edition includes newly commissioned endnotes and commentary by Dale E. Miller, and an index.
About the Author
J. B. Schneewind is a professor of philosophy at Johns Hopkins University. He is the author of Sidgwick’s Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosophy and The Invention of Autonomy.
Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.
On Liberty
Chapter I
Introductory
The subject of this Essay is not the so-called Liberty of the Will,1 so unfortunately opposed to the misnamed doctrine of Philosophical Necessity; but Civil, or Social Liberty: the nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual. A question seldom stated, and hardly ever discussed, in general terms, but which profoundly influences the practical controversies of the age by its latent presence, and is likely soon to make itself recognized as the vital question of the future. It is so far from being new, that, in a certain sense, it has divided mankind, almost from the remotest ages; but in the stage of progress into which the more civilized portions of the species have now entered, it presents itself under new conditions, and requires a different and more fundamental treatment.
The struggle between Liberty and Authority is the most conspicuous feature in the portions of history with which we are earliest familiar, particularly in that of Greece, Rome, and England. But in old times this contest was between subjects, or some classes of subjects, and the government. By liberty, was meant protection against the tyranny of the political rulers. The rulers were conceived (except in some of the popular governments of Greece) as in a necessarily antagonistic position to the people whom they ruled. They consisted of a governing One, or a governing tribe or caste, who derived their authority from inheritance or conquest; who, at all events, did not hold it at the pleasure of the governed, and whose supremacy men did not venture, perhaps did not desire, to contest, whatever precautions might be taken against its oppressive exercise. Their power was regarded as necessary, but also as highly dangerous; as a weapon which they would attempt to use against their subjects, no less than against external enemies. To prevent the weaker members of the community from being preyed upon by innumerable vultures, it was needful that there should be an animal of prey stronger than the rest, commissioned to keep them down. But as the king of the vultures would be no less bent upon preying on the flock than any of the minor harpies, it was indispensable to be in a perpetual attitude of defence against his beak and claws. The aim, therefore, of patriots, was to set limits to the power which the ruler should be suffered to exercise over the community; and this limitation was what they meant by liberty. It was attempted in two ways. First, by obtaining a recognition of certain immunities, called political liberties or rights, which it was to be regarded as a breach of duty in the ruler to infringe, and which, if he did infringe, specific resistance, or general rebellion, was held to be justifiable. A second, and generally a later expedient, was the establishment of constitutional checks; by which the consent of the community, or of a body of some sort supposed to represent its interests, was made a necessary condition to some of the more important acts of the governing power. To the first of these modes of limitation, the ruling power, in most European countries, was compelled, more or less, to submit. It was not so with the second; and to attain this, or when already in some degree possessed, to attain it more completely, became everywhere the principal object of the lovers of liberty. And so long as mankind were content to combat one enemy by an other, and to be ruled by a master, on condition of being guaranteed more or less efficaciously against his tyranny, they did not carry their aspirations beyond this point.
A time, however, came, in the progress of human affairs, when men ceased to think it a necessity of nature that their governors should be an independent power, opposed in interest to themselves. It appeared to them much better that the various magistrates of the State should be their tenants or delegates, revocable at their pleasure. In that way alone, it seemed, could they have complete security that the powers of government would never be abused to their disadvantage. By degrees, this new demand for elective and temporary rulers became the prominent object of the exertions of the popular party, wherever any such party existed; and superseded, to a considerable extent, the previous efforts to limit the power of rulers. As the struggle proceeded for making the ruling power emanate from the periodical choice of the ruled, some persons began to think that too much importance had been attached to the limitation of the power itself. That (it might seem) was a resource against rulers whose interests were habitually opposed to those of the people. What was now wanted was, that the rulers should be identified with the people; that their interest and will should be the interest and will of the nation. The nation did not need to be protected against its own will. There was no fear of its tyrannizing over itself. Let the rulers be effectually responsible to it, promptly removable by it, and it could afford to trust them with power of which it could itself dictate the use to be made. Their power was but the nation's own power, concentrated, and in a form convenient for exercise. This mode of thought, or rather perhaps of feeling, was common among the last generation of European liberalism, in the Continental section of which, it still apparently predominates. Those who admit any limit to what a government may do, except in the case of such governments as they think ought not to exist, stand out as brilliant exceptions among the political thinkers of the Continent. A similar tone of sentiment might by this time have been prevalent in our own country, if the circumstances which for a time encouraged it had continued unaltered.
But, in political and philosophical theories, as well as in persons, success discloses faults and infirmities which failure might have concealed from observation. The notion, that the people have no need to limit their power over themselves, might seem axiomatic, when popular government was a thing only dreamed about, or read of as having existed at some distant period of the past. Neither was that notion necessarily disturbed by such temporary aberrations as those of the French Revolution, the worst of which were the work of an usurping few, and which, in any case, belonged, not to the permanent working of popular institutions, but to a sudden and convulsive outbreak against monarchical and aristocratic despotism. In time, however, a democratic republic came to occupy a large portion of the earth's surface, and made itself felt as one of the most powerful members of the community of nations; and elective and responsible government became subject to the observations and criticisms which wait upon a great existing fact. It was now perceived that such phrases as "self-government," and "the power of the people over themselves," do not express the true state of the case. The "people" who exercise the power, are not always the same people with those over whom it is exercised; and the "self-government" spoken of, is not the government of each by himself, but of each by all the rest. The will of the people, moreover, practically means, the will of the most numerous or the most active part of the people; the majority, or those who succeed in making themselves accepted as the majority: the people, consequently, may desire to oppress a part of their number; and precautions are as much needed against this, as against any other abuse of power. The limitation, therefore, of the power of government over individuals, loses none of its importance when the holders of power are regularly accountable to the community, that is, to the strongest party therein. This view of things, recommending itself equally to the intelligence of thinkers and to the inclination of those important classes in European society to whose real or supposed interests democracy is adverse, has had no difficulty in establishing itself; and in political speculations "the tyranny of the majority" is now generally included among the evils against which society requires to be on its guard.
Like other tyrannies, the tyranny of the majority was at first, and is still vulgarly, held in dread, chiefly as operating through the acts of the public authorities. But reflecting persons perceived that when society is itself the tyrant?society collectively, over the separate individuals who compose it?its means of tyrannizing are not restricted to the acts which it may do by the hands of its political functionaries. Society can and does execute its own mandates: and if it issues wrong mandates instead of right, or any mandates at all in things with which it ought not to meddle, it practises a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since, though not usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself. Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough; there needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them; to fetter the development, and, if possible, prevent the formation, of any individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compel all characters to fashion themselves upon the model of its own. There is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual independence; and to find that limit, and maintain it against encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of human affairs, as protection against political despotism.
But though this proposition is not likely to be contested in general terms, the practical question, where to place the limit?how to make the fitting adjustment between individual independence and social control?is a subject on which nearly everything remains to be done. All that makes existence valuable to any one, depends on the enforcement of restraints upon the actions of other people. Some rules of conduct, therefore, must be imposed, by law in the first place, and by opinion on many things which are not fit subjects for the operation of law. What these rules should be, is the principal question in human affairs; but if we except a few of the most obvious cases, it is one of those which least progress has been made in resolving. No two ages, and scarcely any two countries, have decided it alike; and the decision of one age or country is a wonder to another. Yet the people of any given age and country no more suspect any difficulty in it, than if it were a subject on which mankind had always been agreed. The rules which obtain among themselves appear to them self-evident and self-justifying. This all but universal illusion is one of the examples of the magical influence of custom, which is not only, as the proverb says, a second nature, but is continually mistaken for the first. The effect of custom, in preventing any misgiving respecting the rules of conduct which mankind impose on one another, is all the more complete because the subject is one on which it is not generally considered necessary that reasons should be given, either by one person to others, or by each to himself. People are accustomed to believe, and have been encouraged in the belief by some who aspire to the character of philosophers,2 that their feelings, on subjects of this nature, are better than reasons, and render reasons unnecessary. The practical principle which guides them to their opinions on the regulation of human conduct, is the feeling in each person's mind that everybody should be required to act as he, and those with whom he sympathizes, would like them to act. No one, indeed, acknowledges to himself that his standard of judgment is his own liking; but an opinion on a point of conduct, not supported by reasons, can only count as one person's preference; and if the reasons, when given, are a mere appeal to a similar preference felt by other people, it is still only many people's liking instead of one. To an ordinary man, however, his own preference, thus supported, is not only a perfectly satisfactory reason, but the only one he generally has for any of his notions of morality, taste, or propriety, which are not expressly written in his religious creed; and his chief guide in the interpretation even of that. Men's opinions, accordingly, on what is laudable or blameable, are affected by all the multifarious causes which influence their wishes in regard to the conduct of others, and which are as numerous as those which determine their wishes on any other subject. Sometimes their reason?at other times their prejudices or superstitions: often their social affections, not seldom their antisocial ones, their envy or jealousy, their arrogance or contemptuousness: but most commonly, their desires or fears for themselves?their legitimate or illegitimate self-interest. Wherever there is an ascendant class, a large portion of the morality of the country emanates from its class interests, and its feelings of class superiority. The morality between Spartans and Helots,3 between planters and negroes, between princes and subjects, between nobles and roturiers,4 between men and women, has been for the most part the creation of these class interests and feelings: and the sentiments thus generated, react in turn upon the moral feelings of the members of the ascendant class, in their relations among themselves. Where, on the other hand, a class, formerly ascendant, has lost its ascendency, or where its ascendency is unpopular, the prevailing moral sentiments frequently bear the impress of an impatient dislike of superiority. Another grand determining principle of the rules of conduct, both in act and forbearance, which have been enforced by law or opinion, has been the servility of mankind towards the supposed preferences or aversions of their temporal masters, or of their gods. This servility, though essentially selfish, is not hypocrisy; it gives rise to perfectly genuine sentiments of abhorrence; it made men burn magicians and heretics. Among so many baser influences, the general and obvious interests of society have of course had a share, and a large one, in the direction of the moral sentiments: less, however, as a matter of reason, and on their own account, than as a consequence of the sympathies and antipathies which grew out of them: and sympathies and antipathies which had little or nothing to do with the interests of society, have made themselves felt in the establishment of moralities with quite as great force.
The likings and dislikings of society, or of some powerful portion of it, are thus the main thing which has practically determined the rules laid down for general observance, under the penalties of law or opinion. And in general, those who have been in advance of society in thought and feeling, have left this condition of things unassailed in principle, however they may have come into conflict with it in some of its details.
Most helpful customer reviews
11 of 12 people found the following review helpful.
A bit dry, but worth the effort!
By Steven Phillips
I am interested in Mill's contributions to utilitarian philosophy. Utilitarianism holds that morals should be based upon those acts which promote the greatest good to the greatest number of people. Human actions which foster happiness are held to be right, while those which yield the converse are wrong. Mill defines happiness as intended pleasure with the absence of pain. Also, he maintains that intended pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things desirable as personal ends. Pleasure which employs one's higher faculties tends to give more satisfaction than baser pleasures, or mere sensations. Few humans would exchange their limited, fleeting pleasures for the fullest ration of the pleasures of the "lower" animals. Since a noble character is made happier by its nobleness, utilitarianism can only attain its end towards the multiplication of happiness through a general elevation of the nobleness of the character of the larger population.
Mill states that pleasures and pains have different values to the actor. Only the judgment honed by experience can assist us in assessing appropriate trade-offs in acquiring a particular pleasure at the cost of gaining a specific pain as well. This type of cost/benefit analysis advocated by utilitarians gives rise to the criticism that utilitarianism results in coldness and lack of sympathy towards others. However, Mill claims that the proof of the worth of utilitarianism, or any other moral system, lies in its ability to produce good results.
Although it is sometimes difficult to wade through the dryness of Mill's rhetoric, it is truly worth it for the philosophical insights contained. This book is a good survey of Mill's thoughts on utilitarian ethics and many other subjects of value.
4 of 4 people found the following review helpful.
Every Politician Should Read This
By Jokim Schnoebbe
These three (fairly long) essays on the liberty of the individual, practical ethics, and the role of women are absolutely fundamental. Though written in the mid-19th-century, Mill still has a message for today, and that for three reasons:
(1) He was ahead of his time and his thoughts helped shape our society. By reading him, we are looking at and appreciating our foundation.
(2) His lucid thoughts are a good reminder not to lose our values when we (and especially our governments) are in danger of doing so by unnecessarily infringing on the liberty of the individual.
(3) Some of his critiques are even more applicable today than back then. For example, Mill shows that technological progress, too, can be an infringement on individuality. Said he,
"The circumstances which surround different classes and individuals, and shape their characters, are daily becoming more assimilated. Formerly, different ranks, different neighbourhoods, different trades and professions, lived in what might be called different worlds; at present, to a great degree in the same. Comparatively speaking, they now read the same things, listen to the same things, see the same things, go to the same places, have their hopes and fears directed to the same objects, have the same rights and liberties, and the same means of asserting them. Great as are the differences of position which remain, they are nothing to those which have ceased. And the assimilation is still proceeding. All the political changes of the age promote it, since they all tend to raise the low and to lower the high. Every extension of education promotes it, because education brings people under common influences, and gives them access to the general stock of facts and sentiments. Improvements in the means of communication promote it, by bringing the inhabitants of distant places into personal contact, and keeping up a rapid flow of changes of residence between one place and another."
Reading the same things, listening to the same things, seeing and doing and thinking the same things - that is even more true today than in the 19th century. I think it's safe to say that Mill would have been horrified at much of today's pop culture, pop thinking, and pop politics. Horrified not as some kind of self-righteous purist, but as someone who believed in the value of individuality and who saw individuality destroyed by pop sameness.
One area in which he applied this danger of sameness was education. For me, this is especially interesting, since I live in Germany. For various reasons, my wife and I want to homeschool our children, which is illegal here. Germany does not just have mandatory education, but mandatory *schooling* (a holdover from Hitler, by the way).
Now this is what Mill said about sameness vs. individuality in education:
"If the government would make up its mind to require for every child a good education, it might save itself the trouble of providing one. It might leave to parents to obtain the education where and how they pleased, and content itself with helping to pay the school fees of the poorer classes of children, and defraying the entire school expenses of those who have no one else to pay for them. The objections which are urged with reason against State education, do not apply to the enforcement of education by the State, but to the State's taking upon itself to direct that education: which is a totally different thing.
"That the whole or any large part of the education of the people should be in State hands, I go as far as any one in deprecating. All that has been said of the importance of individuality of character, and diversity in opinions and modes of conduct, involves, as of the same unspeakable importance, diversity of education. A general State education is a mere contrivance for moulding people to be exactly like one another: and as the mould in which it casts them is that which pleases the predominant power in the government, whether this be a monarch, a priesthood, an aristocracy, or the majority of the existing generation, in proportion as it is efficient and successful, it establishes a despotism over the mind, leading by natural tendency to one over the body.
"An education established and controlled by the State should only exist, if it exist at all, as one among many competing experiments, carried on for the purpose of example and stimulus, to keep the others up to a certain standard of excellence. Unless, indeed, when society in general is in so backward a state that it could not or would not provide for itself any proper institutions of education, unless the government undertook the task: then, indeed, the government may, as the less of two great evils, take upon itself the business of schools and universities, as it may that of joint stock companies, when private enterprise, in a shape fitted for undertaking great works of industry, does not exist in the country.
"But in general, if the country contains a sufficient number of persons qualified to provide education under government auspices, the same persons would be able and willing to give an equally good education on the voluntary principle, under the assurance of remuneration afforded by a law rendering education compulsory, combined with State aid to those unable to defray the expense."
Before I end up quoting the whole essay on Liberty, let me draw rein here.
As for the other two essays, in "The Subjection of Women," Mill mainly says (I paraphrase), "Why should we deny women certain rights and positions on the ground that they are supposedly unfit for them? If they are unfit, they will prove their unfitness by trying. If they succeed, they succeed. This means that forbidding them rights is completely superfluous if they are not equal to the task and completely unjust if they are equal."
And the point of the essay "Utilitarianism" is not, as I had previously thought, a justification of the means by the end. It is not a kind of morality that, because it teaches the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people, inevitably leads to the tyranny of the majority over the minority. In fact, like the essay on Liberty, it is a plea for the opposite: for a society that respects and protects the individual as much as possible.
Needless to say, it was a great read. I wish every politician in the world made this their bed-time literature. Come to think of it, it wouldn't hurt to lose a little individuality by *everyone* reading this book.
47 of 48 people found the following review helpful.
Liberty: The Basics
By philiciono
Not that Mill was ever obscure or inaccessible, but while Prof Schneewind's Introduction adds little value, the notes and annotations by Dale E Miller certainly renders this compendium transparent, even to folks like me who have been dumbed down by years of television debates as primary intellectual nourishment. He enlightens each of Mill's chapters with a short and easily assimilated introductory overview. Complementing this with text annotations, collected at the back of the book. The annotations appear to be very well selected, as they are never too numerous to make flipping to the back of the book tedious, yet they manage to illuminate every aspect or item I might have found even remotely confusing, ambiguous or otherwise incomprehensible in the modern idiom.
This text is an excellent starting point for reading JS Mill, and is very well suited to the armchair philosopher who wishes to get into the material with ease and without encumbrance. However, there may be too little in the annotations in terms of external references, or cross references to Mill's other writings, or background information to satisfy the more academically inclined.
Of course anyone with even a nominal interest in what liberty is... NEEDS to read JS Mill. But then, you wouldn't be here if you didn't know that, right?
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